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This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance. Abstract 
In the last few years law and finance scholars have “discovered” the usefulness 
of comparative law. Their studies look at the quantifiable effect that legal rules 
and  their  enforcement  have  on  financial  development  in  different  countries. 
Moreover,  they  link  their  results  with  the  long-standing  distinction  between 
Civil Law and Common Law countries. Whether this revival of “legal families” 
(or “legal origins”) is a useful way forward is, however, a matter of debate. The 
following article challenges these studies, and looks for characteristic features 
which are more precise and meaningful than the use of legal families as such. 
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The comparative lawyer cannot restrict his field narrowly.  
More than any other academic, he must be prepared  







It has been said that the 21
st century will be an “era of comparative law”.
2 The 
problem is, however, how to do comparative law “properly”. In this respect, one 
may be less optimistic: Allegedly, politicians and judges pay no attention to 
comparative law because it is regarded as too complicated and theoretical, and 
can only be understood by a select audience.
3 But, perhaps, there is hope. Re-
cently, law and finance scholars
4 have “discovered” the usefulness of compara-
tive law. Their studies have had an immense impact in academic fields such as 
comparative corporate governance,
5 and their findings are strongly taken into 
account by the World Bank in order to assess the quality of law and legal insti-
tutions. In substance, law and finance scholars look at the quantifiable effect 
that legal rules and their enforcement have on financial development. Thus, they 
ask whether specific legal features, such as a particular legal rule or the effec-
tiveness  of  courts,  correlate  with  economic  data,  such  as  a  country’s  GDP. 
Moreover, most of these studies link their results with the traditional distinction 
between Civil Law and Common Law countries. In particular, this revival of 
“legal families” – or as they call it “legal origins” – may surprise modern com-
parative lawyers. In the last years comparatists increasingly emphasize that law 
is becoming international, transnational, or even global, so that looking at legal 
families is seen as less important.
6 Given these different movements, this article 
discusses the use of legal families by law and finance scholars. Part II summa-
rizes the reasoning and results of their studies. Part III challenges them. Part IV 
looks for characteristic features which are more precise than the use of legal 
families as such, and Part V re-examines the differences between countries ac-
cording to these identifiers. Part VI concludes. 
 
 
II. Legal origins in the law and finance literature 
 
Law and finance scholars see the origins of different legal families in 12
th and 
13
th century England and France.
7 Both countries faced the problem of how 
their legal system could provide protection of law enforcers (such as judges) 
from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The crucial differ-
ence was, according to law and finance scholars, that France was less peaceful 
than England. In France there was therefore a greater need for protection and   2 
control of law enforcers by the state. Consequently, following the Roman law 
tradition, it adopted a system of Civil Law, characterized by fact-finding by 
state-employed judges, automatic review of decisions, and later the reliance on 
codes rather than judicial discretion. In contrast, England developed a system of 
Common Law, which could rely on fact-finding by juries, independent judges, 
infrequent appeals, and judge-made law rather than strict codes. 
 
According to the law and finance literature, this English and French legal tradi-
tion spread throughout the world through conquest, colonization, and imitation.
8 
Furthermore, there are said to be two other Civil Law traditions: The German 
legal tradition, whose crucial adoption is seen in the German Civil Code in 
1900, is – like its French counterpart – based on the Roman Civil Law and was 
also exported to other countries.
9 In contrast, the Scandinavian legal tradition, 
which developed relatively independently in the 17
th and 18
th centuries, is less 
closely  linked  with  Roman  Civil  Law  and  has  not  spread  throughout  the 
world.
10 Finally, some studies refer to the category of a socialist-transition legal 




How exactly legal families spread and why a particular country belongs to a 
particular family is usually not explained in detail. Rather, there are often just 
general references to mainstream comparative law books.
12 As far as explana-
tions are given, they are usually very short so that grouping a particular country 
does not appear to be very difficult. For example, it is said that “Austrian and 
Swiss civil codes were developed at the same time as the German civil code and 
the  three  influenced  each  other  heavily.  In  turn,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, 
Yugoslavia, and Greece relied on German civil law in formulating and modern-
izing their legal systems in the early part of the 20
th century“.
13 About Eastern 
Europe it is said that “we do not apply the Socialist category to countries that 
have gone back to their pre-Soviet legal systems. Latvia had its laws in the 
German civil law tradition prior to annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, and 
it reverted to these laws in 1991. Lithuania was influenced by French and Dutch 
law both before its annexation in 1940 and after independence in 1990. It is 
classified as French legal origin. The remaining former socialist countries in 
central and Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia – followed the German legal 
tradition, with the exception of Romania, which followed the French tradition, 
and Albania, which inherited French legal influences via Italy. These countries 
are assigned to their pre-war legal systems”.
14 
   3 
The core of the law and finance studies lies in looking for correlations between 
law and financial development. This is also applied to legal families. For in-
stance, in one of their first studies La Porta et al. found that the protection of in-
vestors, i.e. shareholders and creditors, is not only strongly related with finan-
cial development but also that differences can be explained by legal origin. Hav-
ing examined 49 countries, their result was that Common Law countries protect 
shareholders  and  creditors  better  than  Civil  Law  countries  (especially  the 
French ones).
15 Recently, Djankov et al. extended this study to the protection of 
creditors in 129 countries. Furthermore, in contrast to La Porta al., they not only 
looked at creditor protection by ex post private dispute resolution but also at the 
use of public credit registries. Here, differences between legal families were 
also found, because Common Law countries rely primarily on the former ex 
post mechanism whereas French Civil Law countries sustain their debt market 
through the latter ex ante institutions.
16 With respect to investor protection, there 
is finally a study by La Porta et al. on securities law in 49 countries. Based on 
various indices their main finding is that there is little evidence that public en-
forcement is important, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and 
facilitating private  enforcement  through liability  rules  benefit  stock  markets. 
This result was also linked to the Common Law-Civil Law distinction. Common 
Law was said to emphasize market discipline and private litigation. As La Porta 
et al. found that private monitoring and contracting were more important than 
public enforcement of securities law, they concluded that these advantages of 
the Common Law family were decisive for the superior quality of securities 
laws of these countries.
17 Other studies also confirm the result that Civil Law 
countries put a stronger emphasis on state involvement. For example, La Porta 
et al. found that in French legal origin countries state-owned enterprises play a 
greater role than in Common Law countries,
18 and there is also more govern-
ment ownership of banks.
19 Djankov et al. analyzed the level of regulation in 
case of entry by new firms in 85 countries. The result was that (French) Civil 
Law countries regulate entry more heavily than Common Law countries.
20 Fi-
nally, reference can be made to Botero et al.’s study on labor markets in 85 
countries, in which it was found that social control of business by labour law is 
higher in (French) Civil Law than in Common Law countries.
21 
 
Recently, some studies were also looking for the mechanisms through which le-
gal origin influences financial development. Two possibilities were identified.
22 
First, legal families may be explained by the “political channel”. This means 
that differences in giving priority to private property rights or rights of the state 
could be crucial. As a proxy for this two studies looked at the judicial control of 
political decisions. They found that, for instance, there is less supreme court 
power in Civil Law than in Common Law countries.
23 State influence is there-
fore regarded as higher in the Civil Law legal family. Second, it could be deci-  4 
sive that legal families respond differently to changing socioeconomic circum-
stances. With respect to this “adaptability channel”, the case law approach by 
the Common Law is seen as more flexible whereas Civil Law is regarded as in-
herently more formalistic and rigid.
24 A study by Djankov et al. on legal pro-
ceedings in 109 countries confirms this result. Djankov et al. looked at various 
variables, such as the need for legal representation and written documents, statu-
tory justification for a complaint, and limits to the use of evidence. Their result 
was that Civil Law countries (in particular the French ones) provide a more 
formalist approach than Common Law countries.
25 Although there are therefore 
studies which confirm differences both in the “political” and in the “adaptabil-
ity” channel, this does not mean that both channels are equally important for fi-
nancial developments. Beck et al. found support for the adaptability channel but 
not the political channel: The differences in supreme court power were not sta-
tistically significant. In contrast the importance of case law was found to be 




III. Problems in distinguishing legal families 
 
In discussing these law and finance studies, one could first of all doubt the ex-
planatory force of legal families. Indeed there are scholars who emphasize that 
other aspects, such as politics, culture, religion, and geography, are considerably 
more important than the belonging to a particular legal family.
27 If one disre-
garded these other aspects, one could easily come to absurd results. This was 
made very clear in a paper by West, which correlates legal families with success 
in the football World Cup!
28 His result was that there was a statistically signifi-
cant positive correlation between World Cup success and French legal origin. 
Thus he concluded: “Perhaps teams from countries with systems based on the 
French model (such as 1998 champion France and 2002 champion Brazil) per-
form well due to the remaining vestiges of the Napoleonic Code that somehow 
remove discretion from coaches and managers in the same manner that the civil 
law  system  curtails judicial  activism.  Or  maybe  – just  maybe  – some  other 
forces are at work.” This is indeed the usual reaction to strange statistical corre-
lations, because robustness checks may expose omitted variable biases.
29 
 
However, the problem of legal families and law and finance lies somewhere 
else. Before you contemplate different channels and check the robustness of 
your results, you have to find out which legal system belongs to which legal 
family. Yet this is not evident at all. Rather, for instance, for about 80 % of the 
129 countries which Djankov et al. examined in their study on creditor rights 
the categorization into legal families
30 is far from clear. This concerns mainly   5 
the legal systems in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The fol-
lowing will illustrate this by a few examples. 
 
First: Eastern Europe. For example, according to Djankov et al. Lithuania be-
longs to the French legal family and Latvia to the German legal family because 
“Latvia had its laws in the German civil law tradition prior to annexation by the 
Soviet Union in 1940, and it reverted to these laws in 1991 (and) Lithuania was 
influenced by French and Dutch law both before its annexation in 1940 and af-
ter independence in 1990”.
31 This is, however, hardly obvious. Although the 
Latvian and Lithuanian civil codes have been influenced by German and French 
law, they are not at all mere copies. Rather they are drafted in a comparative 
fashion which takes different models into account. For instance, a German law-
yer  would  see  that the  Latvian  Civil Code
32 bears some  resemblance to the 
German Civil  Code but he  would  have great difficulty  determining  whether 
more or less than 50 % of the provisions of the Latvian Civil Code were based 
on the German model. More generally, it is also the case that not only German 
and French law influenced Latvian and Lithuanian law. In recent years both le-
gal systems have also been shaped by legal advice from the Nordic countries 
and the US as well as by the implementation of European directives. Moreover, 
the notion of legal families is not only – or perhaps not even primarily – about 
legal rules as such. If one looks at other criteria it becomes clear that Latvia and 
Lithuania should not be separated by legal classifications. The Djankov et al. 
categorisation  disregards  historical  similarities  between  the  Baltic  countries, 
namely the occupations by Germany and Russia, the first and second independ-
ence after World War I and 1990, and the accession to the EU in 2004. This 
common history is also reflected in law, legal culture and legal practice. My 
own experience from teaching students from the three Baltic countries is that 
when I asked them about their law and legal practice their answers could defi-
nitely not be categorized by German and French legal origin. Rather it was the 
case that distinctions such as EU v. non-EU, Eastern v. Western Europe, and 
Baltic v. other countries emerged. As a result, it appears strange that according 
to Djankov et al., for example, Latvia and Taiwan as well as Lithuania and Syria 
are put into the same legal box, but Latvia and Lithuania are categorized differ-
ently. This insight can also be extended to other Eastern European countries be-
cause here too there is often a mixture of different influencing factors as well as 
specific features which are dissimilar to the established Western European legal 
families. 
 
Second, things may get even more evident if one looks at Asian countries. For 
instance, according to Djankov et al., China and Japan are treated as being of 
German legal origin. At least with respect to China this does not make sense at 
all. Djankov et al. give no reasons for their categorization. Probably it was done   6 
because some export of German law to China can be traced. For example, the 
models for the 1993 Chinese Companies Act were primarily the company laws 
of Taiwan, France, Germany and Japan. For language reasons, the Taiwanese 
law in particular was paid close attention to. Yet, Taiwan’s company law is it-
self a hybrid, since it was originally based on German law and after World War 
II came under US influence.
33 As a result, codified Chinese company law is to a 
large extent a mixture of various legal systems and definitely not simply of 
German legal origin. This can also be seen in other areas of law, because, for 
instance, in contrast to Germany (or France) there is no comprehensive civil 
code but “just” a codification of Chinese contract law,
34 and its securities law is 
in principle based on the US model.
35 More difficult is the criticism of Japan’s 
classification as German legal origin. Between 1890 and 1900 Japan did indeed 
copy large parts of the five major German codes.
36 However, these legal trans-
plants have not necessarily persisted. For example, the Japanese Commercial 
Code has been substantially changed after World War II, in particular because 
of American influence. The same is true for other areas of trade and business 
law.
37 Yet the more fundamental counter-argument is that it is not enough to 
look at the legal rules only. Considering the deeper structures of legal systems, 
the mere distinction between French, German, Nordic Civil Law and Common 
Law becomes very legalistic and Eurocentric.
38 In particular, legal culture is 
crucial for a meaningful understanding of different legal traditions. Legal cul-
ture refers to those elements in law that go beyond the mere content of statutory 
or case law. For instance, it covers the historical background to a legal system, 
the emergence of sources of law, the systematization of the law, the style of ar-
gument and codification, and the ranking of law in a country’s social order.
39 
The importance of these factors should not be underestimated. It can even be 
claimed  that  “legal  transplants”  are  not  possible,  because  formally  identical 
rules are differently interpreted and applied in different legal systems, so that 
they do not survive the journey from one legal system to another unchanged.
40 
In any case it is necessary to take the characteristics of Asian legal traditions
41 
into account in order to avoid misleading results by superimposing European 
legal families to other continents. 
 
Third, this call for a more tentative approach is confirmed by looking at Africa. 
Based on the history of colonization, Djankov et al. regard, for example, the 
former English colonies Botswana and Ghana as English legal origin and the 
former  French  colonies  Mali  and  Niger as  French  legal origin.  One  misses, 
however, reference to the former German colonies, such as for instance Namibia 
and Togo. The reason for this is probably that the German colonization did not 
last very long (1884-1919) and that therefore law and legal culture in Namibia 
and Togo may not have changed significantly and permanently. Yet, one can 
wonder whether this has been fundamentally different in other African coun-  7 
tries. A mere categorization of a system as English Common Law or French 
Civil Law disregards again deeper legal structures, such as the question how 
courts work or how new law, old law and customs interact. Thus, the fundamen-
tal question how the imposed new legal traditions mixed with chthonic and Is-
lamic legal traditions
42 has to be answered in order to get to a meaningful de-
scription of legal families in Africa.
43 This is not merely of conceptual impor-
tance. For instance, in Islamic commercial law there are Islamic partnerships but 
no  corporations  because  concept  of  separate  legal  personality  is  unknown.
44 
Thus, for certain questions, such as the shareholder protection in different coun-
tries,
45 there is a fundamentally different starting point in comparison with the 
commercial law of the West. The law and finance categorization is therefore too 
much focused on European/Western legal traditions. As a result, it can be sug-
gested that a more significant distinction would be between the legal conception 
of the West, which may be characterized by its Christian roots, its specific form 
of rationality and its concept of rights, and African legal traditions which de-
spite colonization continue to exist.
46 
 
Fourth, Latin America may be regarded as less problematic. Law and finance 
studies treat the Latin American countries as French legal origin. It is indeed 
correct that via Spain and Portugal almost all of them were influenced by the 
Civil Law tradition as exemplified by the French Civil Code. Yet even law and 
finance scholars see differences between the European “parent tradition” and its 
Latin American “offsprings”. In particular – citing Merryman
47 – it is said that 
the exportation of the Napoleonic Code had more pernicious effects in French, 
Belgian, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese colonies than in France itself.
48 Conse-
quently, the fact that in most law and finance studies the French legal family 
performs worst
49 is mainly a statement about Latin America. Yet, it is doubtful 
whether this is really linked with the export of French statutory law to these 
countries. It is likely that legal and economic problems would not be signifi-
cantly different if they had not copied the French but, for instance, the German 
Civil Code. This can also be seen by the fact that there has been some German 
influence on Brazilian law
50 and some US-influence on the commercial law of 
most Latin American countries without having caused an automatic change for 
the better. Thus the problems which exist in Latin America seem to be more 
linked with the impact of colonization as such
51 than with the takeover of pieces 
of particular foreign statutory laws.
52 
 
As a result, one cannot escape the conclusion that the law and finance categori-
zation of legal families which aims to cover most countries of the world, is to a 
large extent just arbitrary. This is also in line with insights of general compara-
tive law. Even comparative lawyers who still apply the notion of legal families 
emphasize its limits: For instance, legal traditions are said to be just “a loose   8 
conglomeration of data”,
53 the idea of legal families “is used purely for explana-
tory purposes”,
54 and even if “we mostly continue to divide the world into civil 
law, common law, and several other systems, (…) we know that these are ideal 
types which merely serve our need to maintain a rough overview“.
55 Thus the 
criticism set forth in this section does not mean that one should not talk about 
comparative law by using legal families. For a textbook on comparative law it 
makes sense to have chapters about different legal families, such as for instance 
in Zweigert & Kötz’s book
56 about “the Romanistic legal family”, “the Ger-
manic legal family”, “the Anglo-American legal family”, “the Nordic legal fam-
ily”,  “the  law in the  Far  East”  and  “religious legal systems”,  or  in Glenn’s 
book
57 about “a chthonic legal tradition”, “a Talmudic legal tradition”, “a Civil 
Law  tradition”,  “an  Islamic  legal  tradition”,  “a  Common  Law  tradition”,  “a 
Hindu legal tradition”, and “an Asian legal tradition”. In these books the authors 
can sufficiently address the problems to what extent, first, the spread of a par-
ticular legal tradition has really changed previous traditions, second, is not su-
perposed  by  more  recent  legal  traditions,  and,  third,  secular  legal  traditions 
(such as Common and Civil Law) and religiously-inspired legal traditions (such 
as Islamic, Hindu, and Talmudic law) interact in the same country.
58 However, 
for an econometric study, such as performed by law and finance scholars, clear 
criteria are necessary because otherwise measurement errors and biased coeffi-
cients come about. 
 
 
IV. Unbundling legal families: The search for characteristic features 
 
The criticism put forward in Part III does not mean that different legal origins 
are irrelevant. The general statement that “a country’s legal heritage shapes its 
approach to property rights, private contracting, investor protection, and hence 
financial development”
59 indeed makes sense. Yet, at least for an econometric 
study on law and finance one has to find more precise criteria than worldwide 
distinctions  between  different  legal  families.  Thus  this  section  will  look  for 




A. Difficult identifiers 
 
First of all, one could contemplate that the relevance of Roman law in a particu-
lar legal system is an appropriate criterion. The reason for this is that Civil Law 
but not Common Law is said to be based on the Roman law tradition.
61 Yet 
there are problems. On the one hand, no contemporary legal system is entirely 
based on Roman law. This concerns even traditional Civil Law countries such 
as France and Germany. Both France and Germany can be regarded as mixed   9 
legal systems because apart from Roman law the “droit coutumier” of tribes 
from Northern France and Germanic sources of law influenced their legal sys-
tems.
62 On the other hand, in Common Law countries various traces of Roman 
law may be found. For instance, in Glenn’s description of English law there are 
repeated references to Roman law, starting with the influence by canon law and 
concluding with the role of the European Union.
63 It would therefore be neces-
sary to set a threshold, such as 50 %, that determines whether a legal system can 
be called “Roman”. However, the problem is how to find out whether a country 
does contain this “level” of Roman law. As this would be very burdensome (if 
not impossible), the factor “Roman law” should therefore not be used. 
 
Similarly, it would be difficult to ascertain, for instance, the “Frenchness” or 
“Germanness” of a country’s Civil Code. Although it is true that many countries 
have been influenced by the French and German Civil Code, probably no coun-
try has a code which is identical to the French and German model. Even the 
codes of countries with close ties may look quite different. For instance, in the 
German, Austrian, and Swiss Civil Codes there is probably no provision which 
is exactly the same in two of these countries. Furthermore, the structure, lan-
guage, and various legal concepts are quite different in these three codes. Even 
for these countries, it would therefore be a very time-consuming effort to look at 
the circa 2000 provisions of each code, find out their similarities and differ-
ences, and establish a threshold that has to be reached in order to put these three 
countries in the same box. For non-European countries, whose codes are usually 
drawn up in a comparative fashion, these problems are multiplied. Thus the 
closeness to a specific code would also not be a very efficient standard. 
 
Similar  problems  arise  for the  criterion whether there is  sufficient Common 
Law influence in a particular legal system. The law, legal culture, and legal 
practice of countries which are said to belong to the Common Law family can 
differ significantly. For instance, one can make the claim that it is today far 
from obvious whether the United States does really belong to the Common Law 
family because “in many respects US law represents a deliberate rejection of 
common law principle, with preference being given to more affirmative ideas 
clearly derived from civil law (…)”.
64 For countries in which pre-Common Law 
traditions are still relevant one can have even more doubts. An example might 
be India, because despite the relevance of the Common Law traditions older tra-
ditions, such as – in Glenn’s categorization – chthonic, Islamic, Hindu, and 
Asian law may be too deeply rooted to be just disregarded.
65 Similarly, it is said 
about Thailand that it “has had in its modern texture a real mixture of sources 
such as English Law, German Law, French law, Swiss Law, Japanese Law and 
American Law (…) alongside historic sources in existence since 1283, such as 
rules from indigenous culture and tradition, customary laws and Hindu jurispru-  10
dence, still to be found in some modern enactments.”
66 As a result, one would 
therefore need to establish a specific criterion – such as whether the most impor-
tant judgments of English case law are regarded as “good law”– in order to de-
termine whether a country belongs to the Common Law family. Once again, this 
would, however, be very difficult or even impossible in practice. 
 
B. Suitable identifiers 
 
A more fruitful criterion is the European colonization of the 16
th-20
th century. 
This is in general a precise criterion, although one has to clarify how to deal 
with  short  term  colorizations  and  how  to  categorize  countries  which  subse-
quently were colonies of two different colonial powers. It also covers parts of 
the conventional legal family definition, because colonies of the same country 
are usually treated as members of the same legal family. Its advantage is, how-
ever, that it looks at the impact of colonization on a particular country as a 
whole and not only at legal transplantations which may have been superficial or 
temporary only. Yet, the interpretation of its results may still reveal that the par-
ticular way how the new law was applied may have influenced the development 
of this country. For instance, it is said that “English technique generally in-
volved a more hands-off approach” whereas “the French saw a more universal 
role for a more universal French law”.
67 This may explain differences between 
former English and French colonies.  
 
Another factor which can be used is language. At first sight this may appear 
strange, because one language is not better than another and therefore does not 
as such influence financial development. Yet language is a good proxy in order 
to find out how good ideas “travel” between different countries. This is obvious 
if you take the view that translations are always imperfect,
68 because in this case 
even the phenomenon of international languages (first Latin, then French, now 
English) and the possibility of translations would not enable accurate communi-
cation between different native speakers. Yet, even if it is overstated, there is no 
denying  the  fact  that  the  commonality  of  a  language  is  relevant,  because  a 
common language facilitates not only the copying of black letter law but also 
the exchange of information on its philosophical, sociological, and economical 
background and its application in practice. 
 
In line with the traditional distinction between Civil and Common Law is the 
criterion that statutory law is more important in the former and courts are more 
important in the latter countries.
69 As in all countries statutory law and courts 
coexist, the problem is, of course, how to find out what is “more” important. A 
possible (though rather formal) standard would be the existence of a compre-
hensive civil code which covers at least contract, tort, unjust enrichment, fam-  11
ily, and succession law. This could be seen as an indication of what lawyers of a 
particular country expect a “proper legal system” to look like, namely exten-
sively codified and logically structured by abstract legal norms. A more material 
criterion would be, for instance, the independence and power of judges and thus 
a reduced influence of statutory law. In this respect, law and finance research on 
the “political channel”
70 can be used in order to classify different countries. 
 
A similar but not identical factor is the formality or flexibility of a legal system. 
Although it could be suggested that formality is linked with statutory law and 
flexibility with judge-made law, this is not necessarily the case, because in prin-
ciple the former can be drafted flexibly and case law can also be rigid. The link 
of this criterion with legal families is that in particular the French Civil Law is 
regarded as more formal than those of other legal origins.
71 As a proxy for for-
mality or flexibility the law and finance research on the “adaptability channel”
72 
can be used in order to classify different countries. 
 
 
V. Re-examining the differences 
 
It was argued above that the present use of legal families by law and finance 
studies is highly problematic. For instance, in the Djankov et al. study on credi-
tor rights in 129 countries the calculation of means by legal origin (see Table 1) 
is not meaningful, because the way of how the countries are assigned to differ-
ent legal origins is to a large extent just random (see III., above). 
 
Table 1: Djankov et al.:
73 Creditor Rights by Legal Origin 
Legal Origin  Mean 
English  2.222 
French  1.328 
German  2.333 
Nordic  1.750 
Socialist  2.182 




English v. French: 3.721  
(significant at the 1 % level) 
 
 
However, categorizations can indeed be interesting in order to find out why 
there may be, for instance, differences in creditor protection. Thus, I have used 
the Djankov et al. data on creditor protection and grouped the 129 countries by 
“colonization”, “language”, “importance of statutory and case law” and “for-
mality and flexibility of legal systems” as proxies for legal origin (see Table 2).  
 
The categorization of countries by colonization and language ((see (1) and (2)) 
contains some countries which are just classified as “Others”. This was neces-  12
sary because they neither had been colonies nor do they belong to one of the 
seven language groups of this Table. Moreover, some countries (e.g., Togo, Bu-
rundi, Rwanda, Tanzania) had been colonies of various colonial powers so that 
they could not be categorized in this respect. Vis-à-vis languages a slightly dif-
ferent approach was applied. As my main interest is the function of uniform 
languages as means of communication about law and legal practice, I regarded 
it as sufficient if, as for instance in the case of India, one of the official lan-
guages is English. Only when a double assignment was necessary, has a country 
been classified as one of the “Others”. This rule, however, was not applied in 
cases where one official language is considerably more influential than another 
(e.g. English in Canada, German in Switzerland). 
 
For the categorization of countries according to the importance of statutory and 
case law, as well as for the categorization based on formality and flexibility of 
legal systems, the proxies “supreme court power” and “legal justification” (see 
(3) and (4)) were used. The data derive from studies by Beck et al. and Djankov 
et al. and have not been re-examined. The variable “supreme court power” is 
explained in Table 2. The variable “legal justification” is “formed by the nor-
malized sum of: (i) complaint must be legally justified, (ii) judgment must be 
legally justified, and (iii) judgment must be on law (not on equity). The index 
ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values mean a higher use of legal language or 
justification.”   13
 
Table 2:  Different Criteria 
(1) Creditor Rights by Colonization 
Countries 
 
Number  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
Former English colonies  28  2.179  1.219 
Former French colonies  24  0.75  1.113 
Former Spanish colonies  18  1.667  1.328 
Former Portuguese colo-
nies 
3  1.33  0.577 




Former English v. former French 
colonies:  
4.3853 (significant at the 1 % 
level) 
 
(2) Creditor Rights by Language 
Countries where people 
speak… 
 
Number  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
English   27  2.380  1.244 
French  16  0.5  0.816 
Spanish  19  1.684  1.293 
Portuguese  4  1.25  0.5 
Arabic  14  1.5  1.344 
Scandinavian languages  4  1.75  0.957 
German  3  2.333  1.155 




English v. French: 5.384 
 (significant at the 1 % level) 
 




Number  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
control of administrative 
cases 
46  2.086  1.151 
no control of administrative 
cases 
14  1.714  1.267 
       
term of supreme court 
judges of at least 6 years 
49  2  1.137 
term of 2 to 6 years  9  2.111  1.537 




control v. no control: 1.034 
(not significant) 
 
(4) Creditor Rights by Legal Justification
76 
Countries with…  
 
Number  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
flexible legal justification (0)  6  2.5  1.225 
partly flexible legal justification 
(0.33) 
14  2.5  1.225 
partly inflexible legal justification 
(0.66) 
28  1.821  1.090 
inflexible legal justification (1)  23  1.565  1.121 
 
T-Test 
partly flexible v. partly 
inflexible: 1.827 
(significant at the 10 % 
level) 
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The results show that differences between countries can be categorized accord-
ing to these criteria which are related to legal origins. Thus, legal rules are not 
only technical tools but still significantly influenced by history and (legal) cul-
ture. Yet, it matters which of the four identifiers is used. Looking at their statis-
tical significance, colonization and language appear to be more important. Yet, 
the high significance of these criteria for credit protection may also just be ex-
plained  by  the  fact that  the  questions  which  determine  the  credit  protection 
score were drafted by English-speaking lawyers of one of the former English 
colonies (namely: the United States).
77 It could therefore simply confirm the ex-
pectation that among countries with the same language ideas spread more eas-
ily. Thus, the third and fourth criteria are also important because they may re-
flect deeper levels of legal culture.  
 
In order to understand the results it is useful to look at the overlaps between 
these four identifiers. The classifications based on colonization and language are 
similar but not identical. As the former looks at history and the latter at the pre-
sent situation, some groups of the first identifier have lost some of their mem-
bers. In this respect, language is more precise because, for instance, it takes into 
account that in the Arabic-speaking countries the ties with their former occupi-
ers may have weakened. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, the 
criterion “colonization” can have the advantage that the former colonial powers 
are not included, and thus it may cover problems that are specific to former 
colonies.  
 
With respect to supreme court power, it is of interest that all of the former Eng-
lish colonies (and English speaking countries) belong to the 46 countries where 
there is supreme court control of administrative cases and to the 49 countries 
where the term of supreme court judges is more than six years. Apart from that, 
there is a mixed picture for the supreme court control of administrative cases 
because the 14 “no-control” countries are former French, Spanish and Portu-
guese colonies as well as French, Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic, German and 
Scandinavian speaking countries. Regarding the term of supreme court judges, 
more than 6 of the 11 countries where judges are appointed for less than six 
years belong to the former Spanish colonies (as well as Spanish speaking coun-
tries).  
 
Even more diverse are the results for legal justification. As expected, the Eng-
lish-speaking countries (as well as the former English colonies) are flexible in 
this respect (mean: 0.42). Yet, the score for the Nordic countries is even slightly 
better  (mean:  0.418).  The  results  for  French  and  Arabic  speaking  countries 
(means: 0.668; 0.736) as well as for the former French colonies (mean: 0.716) 
indicate that these countries are partly inflexible. Finally, German, Spanish, and   15
Portuguese speaking countries (means: 0.89; 0.903; 1) as well as the former 
Spanish and Portuguese colonies (means: 0.897; 1) are least flexible.  
 
This article cannot explain in detail why there are differences in these four iden-
tifiers. Yet, it is apparent that these differences confirm my criticism on the use 
of one narrow criterion, such as Common Law and (French, German, Nordic) 
Civil Law. The results by Djankov et al. and other law and finance scholars who 
use this criterion (Table 1) are most similar to my results in using the proxies 
“colonization” and “language” (Table 2). My approach has, however, the advan-
tage that it clearly identifies the basis for my categorizations. If one talks about 
colonies (and not members of the same legal origin) it becomes clear that the 
reasons for differences among countries may not only lie in law (including legal 
culture and practice) but also, for instance, in ongoing political and economical 
effects of colonization.
78 The same is true for “language” because it does not 




Furthermore, in using these criteria it makes sense to classify some countries 
just as “Others” because they have never been colonies and do not belong to one 
of the major linguistic families.
80 In contrast, Djankov et al. just bring into play 
a different decision criterion because, in the case of these other countries, they 
implicitly look at the transplantation of a particular piece of statutory law.
81 
Even if they had done this diligently,
82 it still would have been necessary to 
identify this transplantation as a separate criterion, such as the “Frenchness” or 
“Germanness” of a country’s Civil Code.
83 
 
Finally, some law and finance scholars misallocate the answer to the question of 
how legal thinking affects the law of different countries. They take it as given 
that countries belong to a particular legal family so that one has to examine the 
“channel” through which these different legal families shape finance.
84 Yet, the 
classification of legal families is “not just simply there”. Instead, the idea of le-
gal families has different components. One of them is, for instance, whether le-
gal systems follow a formal or flexible way of legal reasoning. The adaptability 
of legal systems is therefore important but not as adaptability “channel” but as a 
criterion  which  can  help  to  identify  commonalities  and  differences  in  legal 
thinking, regardless of any preconception about Civil and Common Law coun-
tries. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
“Comparative law is bound to be superficial.”
85 Therefore, the mere use of cate-
gorizations which are not one hundred per cent accurate would not be a fair 
counter-argument against law and finance studies. Furthermore, there are indeed 
good reasons why the reduction of complexity by this kind of “numerical com-
parative law” can be a way forward.
86 However, with respect to the specific 
question of legal origins, these studies are questionable. The world-wide distinc-
tion between different legal families, such as Common Law and (French, Ger-
man, Nordic) Civil Law is not useful for econometric calculations. Instead more 
precise criteria have to be found. My proposal is that, for instance, the proxies 
“colonization”, “language”, “importance of statutory and case law”, and “for-
mality and flexibility of legal systems” should be used. This article has already 
initiated how this new approach may look like, because the legal family distinc-
tion in the Djankov et al. study on creditor protection in 129 countries can easily 
be replaced by more meaningful and more specific criteria. Future research may 
also apply these criteria for correlations and regressions.
87 Then it could, for in-
stance, be scrutinized how the impact of legal origin on investor protection (or: 
the success in the football World Cup)
88 would change if these four (or other) 
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Definitions: CR = creditor rights according to Djankov et al. (supra note 11); EC 
= former English colonies; FC = former French colonies; SC = former Spanish 
colonies; PC = former Portuguese colonies; E= English speaking countries; Sp 
=  Spanish  speaking  countries;  F =  French  speaking  countries;  G  =  German 
speaking countries; Sc = Countries where one of the Scandinavian languages is 
spoken; A = Arabic speaking countries; P = Portuguese speaking countries 
 
  CR  EC  FC  SC  PC  E  Sp  F  G  Sc  A  P 
Albania  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Algeria  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Angola  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Argentina  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Armenia  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Australia  3  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Austria  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
Azerbaijan  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Bangladesh  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Belarus  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Belgium  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Benin  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Bolivia  2  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Bosnia & 
Herz  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Botswana  3  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Brazil  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Bulgaria  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Burkina 
Faso  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Burundi  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Cambodia  2  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Cameroon  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Canada  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Central  
Africa  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Chad  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Chile  2  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
China  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Colombia  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0   28
 
Congo 
(Rep.)  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Congo  
(Zaire)  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Costa Rica  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Cote d' Ivoire  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Croatia  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Czech Re-
public  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Denmark  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
Dominican 
Republic  2  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Ecuador  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Egypt  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
El Salvador  3  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Ethiopia  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Finland  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
France  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Georgia  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Germany  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
Ghana  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Greece  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Guatemala  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Guinea  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Haiti  2  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Honduras  2  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Hong Kong  4  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Hungary  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
India  2  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Indonesia  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Iran  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Ireland  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Israel  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Italy  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Jamaica  2  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Jordan  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Kazakhstan  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Kenya  4  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Korea, Rep.  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Kuwait  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0   29
 
Kyrgyz  
Republic  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Lao,  
People' s 
Dem  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Latvia  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Lebanon  4  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Lesotho  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Lithuania  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Macedonia  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Madagascar  2  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Malawi  2  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Malaysia  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Mali  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Mauritania  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Mexico  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Moldova  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Mongolia  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Morocco  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Mozambique  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Namibia  2  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Nepal  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Netherlands  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
New  
Zealand  4  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Nicaragua  4  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Niger  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Nigeria  4  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Norway  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
Oman  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Pakistan  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Panama  4  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Papua New 
Guinea  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Paraguay  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Peru  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Philippines  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Poland  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Portugal  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Puerto Rico  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Romania  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   30
 
Russia  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Rwanda  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Saudi Arabia  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Senegal  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Serbia 
Monte  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Sierra Leone  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Singapore  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Slovak Re-
public  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Slovenia  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
South Africa  3  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Spain  2  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Sweden  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
Switzerland  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
Syria  3  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Taiwan  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Tanzania  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Thailand  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Togo  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Tunisia  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Turkey  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Uganda  2  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Ukraine  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
United Arab 
Emirates  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
United 
Kingdom  4  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
United 
States  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Uruguay  3  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Uzbekistan  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Venezuela  3  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Vietnam  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Yemen  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Zambia  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Zimbabwe  4  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 